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THE LEGALITY OF THE NATO BOMBING
OPERATION IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
Aaron Schwabacht
On March 24, 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) forces began bombing targets in the former Yugoslavia
in an effort to end Yugoslavia's war against its ethnic Albanian
population.1 American, British and French forces under NATO
command began bombing Serbian targets throughout
Yugoslavia. 2
A great deal of attention has been focused on the military
and humanitarian effectiveness of the bombing campaign. At
the time of this writing, it is impossible to determine whether
the NATO strikes will have the desired effect.3 Regardless of
the outcome, an international event of this magnitude, involv-
ing three of the five permanent members of the Security Council
(France, The United Kingdom, and The United States), is bound
to have an impact on international law.
The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the
NATO action in the context of international law relating to the
f Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Legal Studies,
Thomas Jefferson School of Law; J.D., Boalt Hall, 1989; e-mail aarons@tjsl.edu.
1 See The West Versus Serbia, ECONOMIST, March 27, 1999, at 49. For pur-
poses of convenience in this article, the term "Yugoslavia" is used to refer to the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [hereinafter FRY]. The use of this name does not
reflect any acknowledgement of the validity of the FRY's claim to be the successor
state to the former Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations
of the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslova-
kia: Do They Continue in Force?, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1994). Where it
seems appropriate, the geographic components of the FRY are referred to as Mon-
tenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina. The latter two are currently part of the
republic of Serbia; whether Kosovo should be a part of Serbia is, of course, the
central issue in the conflict.
2 See The West Versus Serbia, supra note 1, at 49; see also Bruno Simma,
Kosovo: A Thin Red Line, 10 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 6 (1999) (a history of the polit-
ical and legal events leading up to the NATO bombings).
3 This article was written in March 1999. Events since that time have shown
that the NATO campaign did, for the most part, achieve its objectives.
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use of force. To that end, this article will examine the legality of
the bombings under current international law, as well as the
effect that the action may have on the development of interna-
tional law.
I. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Some, at least, of the sources of international law are listed
in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice:
international conventions; . . . international custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law;.., the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations; judicial decisions; and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions .... 4
For the most part, the sources of law listed in the statute
(other than international conventions) can be grouped together
under the heading of "customary international law,"5 although
this is to some extent an oversimplification. General principles
of law have traditionally been seen as a third category of public
international law. However, they can also be seen as "supple-
mental rules" or as a "secondary source of law."6 Judicial deci-
sions and the teachings of the most qualified publicists are
merely a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law."7 In any event, judicial decisions and, to the extent that a
state actually observes them, general principles of law are state
practice, and thus form the basis for normative expectations.
Customary international law, in contrast to treaty law, is
derived from the practice of states as international actors. Cus-
4 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.1055,
art 38(1). The Statute is silent as to which nations are to be considered "civilized."
5 On the different approaches to the sources of customary international law,
see W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in
the Study of International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1984); see also Andrew W.
Willard, Incidents: An Essay in Method, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 21 (1984); W. Michael
Reisman, International Incidents: The Law that Counts in World Politics, 10 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1 (1988); Bowett, International Incidents: New Genre or New Delusion,
12 YALE J. INT'L L. 386 (1987); W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the
Late 20th Century, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 133 (1987).
6 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(4) cmt. 1 and reporter's note 7 (1987).
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 4.
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tomary international law is perhaps best described as a set of
normative expectations developed through observation of the
actions of states.
II. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION
All of the NATO member states are also members of the
United Nations (U.N.). As members of the U.N., these five
states are required to abide by the provisions set forth in the
Charter of United Nations (U.N. Charter). The U.N. Charter
permits states to use armed force against other states only in
two situations: when required or permitted by a resolution of
the Security Council,8 or when the state is acting in self-
defense. 9
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Purposes of the United Nations.10
The NATO bombing is a "use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity" of Yugoslavia, if not against its "political indepen-
dence," and therefore a violation of the U.N. Charter.
Pursuant to Chapter Seven of the U.N. Charter, the Secur-
ity Council is given the authority to act in order to preserve
peace and safety of the international community. The Security
Council, although it has repeatedly addressed the Kosovo issue,
did not specifically authorize the use of force against Yugosla-
via. The United States and NATO have maintained that the
resolution is implicitly authorized by Security Council resolu-
tions 1160,11 1199,12 and 1203,13 and that only the certainty of a
s U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 4.
9 See id. at art. 51.
10 See id. at art. 2, para 4.
11 S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Scor, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160
(1998).
12 S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199
(1998).
13 S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3 9 3 7 th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203
(1998).
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Russian and/or Chinese veto stood in the way of a Security
Council resolution explicitly authorizing action against Yugo-
slavia. Security Council Resolution 1199, in particular, deter-
mined that the situation in Kosovo is "a threat to peace and
security in the region." 14 Prior to the bombings, NATO Secre-
tary-General Solana referred to and repeated this phrase in a
statement concluding "that the Allies believe that in ... respect
to the present crisis in Kosovo as described in U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1199, there are legitimate grounds for the
Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use force." 15 Despite
the assertions of the NATO members, however, the likelihood of
a veto of any explicit authorization by not one but two of the
permanent members makes it clear that NATO's action is not
authorized by the Security Council. 16 The Security Council was
never intended to decide matters upon a "one country, one vote"
principle, and the veto power given to the five permanent mem-
bers exists for good reason.
In order for NATO's action to be legal, it must either be
self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or be permit-
ted by some rule of customary international law not in conflict
with the NATO states' obligations under Article 2(4).
A. NATO's actions as self-defense under the U.N. Charter
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides in part that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-national
peace and security. 17
14 S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 12, at 2.
15 See Simma, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting a letter dated October 9, 1998 from
Secretary-General Solana to the North Atlantic Council).
16 Secretary-General Kofi-Annan, less than two months before the beginning
of the NATO bombings, met with the North Atlantic Council concerning the Ko-
sovo situation. When asked about the permissibility of a NATO action against
Yugoslavia, he replied "normally a U.N. Security Council Resolution is required."
Simma, supra note 2, at 3. On the same day, NATO Secretary-General Solana
stated that Kofi-Annan's visit indicated "that the United Nations shares our deter-
mination and objectives." Id.
17 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
[Vol. 11:405
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/6
NATO BOMBING IN YUGOSLAVIA
Self-defense, therefore, may be either individual or collec-
tive. There is considerable disagreement as to where the limits
of "collective self-defense" lie, and also as to whether self-de-
fense may be anticipatory rather than merely reactive.
The International Court of Justice has stated that the mere
fact that a country is a threatening presence is insufficient to
trigger the Article 51 right of collective self-defense., A cus-
tomary international law right of anticipatory self-defense has
existed at least since the Caroline case, decided in 1842.19 The
Caroline test requires that anticipatory self-defense be propor-
tional, and that the need be "necessary, instant, overwhelming,
and admitting of no other alternative with no moment for
deliberation."20
There is considerable disagreement as to whether a right of
anticipatory self-defense exists in light of the U.N. Charter.
Those who see the existence of such a right disagree on whether
the Caroline formulation is applicable in an era of modern
weaponry. At the beginning of the U.N. era, the Caroline
formula was applied in essentially unchanged form: "Prevent-
ative action in foreign territory is justified only in the case of an
instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation." 21 NATO's ac-
tion may be proportional to the magnitude of the threat posed
by Yugoslavia, and the need may also be, in decreasing order of
likelihood, necessary, overwhelming, and instant. However,
there were probably other alternatives open to NATO, and
there have certainly been enough moments for deliberation:
NATO contemplated some form of action against Yugoslavia
over the Kosovo question for months before acting.
18 See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27). This view has been heavily criticized by commentators, espe-
cially in the United States. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 206 (1987).
19 See R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. INT'L L. 82,
89 (1938). On the right of anticipatory self-defense, see generally George K.
Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense: What the Treaties Have Said, 31 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 321 (1998) (concluding that the inherent right to anticipatory col-
lective self-defense still exists).
20 Id.
21 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences,
Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 205 (1947).
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Article 51 uses language ("Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair.. .") arguably acknowledging the prior existence of
a customary law right to self-defense, and indicating an intent
that the right be retained by the member states. The reference
to "armed attack" may have been intended to limit that right in
some way, as the International Court of Justice indicated in the
Nicaragua case,22 or it may simply have been an inexact render-
ing of the French text, which refers simply to l'agresion.
Yugoslavia is a threatening presence in the Balkans. Since
it came into existence in 1991, Yugoslavia has already taken
direct and/or indirect military action against Croatia, Bosnia,
and (briefly) Slovenia. Yugoslavia's war with Croatia and sup-
port for the Serbian side in the Bosnian civil war were aimed at
expanding the borders of Serb-held and Serb-populated terri-
tory; thus, all states bordering or including some piece of Serb-
populated territory must feel a certain amount of apprehension.
The same holds true for states possessing territory to which
Serbia has some historical claim, as it does to Kosovo.
None of the NATO members have been attacked by Yugo-
slavia. Physically, none of the NATO members borders Kosovo,
and only one borders Yugoslavia: Hungary shares a border with
Vojvodina. The involvement of other states, if it is legal at all,
is legal as an exercise of collective, not individual, self-defense.
This is clearest in the case of the United States and Canada,
which are beyond the reach of any effective threat by
Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia has warned all of the states with which it
shares borders not to participate "directly or indirectly" in any
NATO actions. 23 Hungary, as a NATO member, is already par-
ticipating at least indirectly. Macedonia, where 12,000 NATO
troops are based,24 is probably participating directly, and defi-
nitely participating indirectly.
The problem with using Yugoslavia's threats as a justifica-
tion for the exercise of the Article 51 right of self-defense, how-
22 See Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 18.
23 See The West Versus Serbia, supra note 1, at 49.
24 See id. The name "Macedonia" in this article is also used for convenience,
and does not imply any opinion on the controversy over the use of that name. See,
e.g., Igor Janev, Note, Legal Aspects of the Use of a Provisional Name for Macedo-
nia in the United Nations System, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (1999).
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ever, is that the warnings were given after the first NATO
attacks. That threats were given at all, though, is further proof
that Yugoslavia, as long as it continues its drive to expand its
"ethnically pure" Serbian territory, is a constant threat to its
borders.
If a collective right of anticipatory self-defense does exist,
the NATO action would appear to be justified. 25 Yugoslavia's
actions in Kosovo, coupled with its recent history of aggression
across its borders, renders the likelihood of an armed attack on
a neighboring country fairly high. Although most of those coun-
tries are not NATO members, NATO has assured Albania, Bul-
garia, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia that it would view a
Yugoslav attack on them "very gravely."26 A formal treaty is
not necessary to establish the existence of collective self-de-
fense; informal arrangements of this nature are probably
sufficient. 27
The Kosovo Liberation Army has been, in part, armed by
elements of the Albanian armed forces. 28 There is substantial
sympathy in Albania for the Kosovars, and at least 65,000
Kosovar refugees have entered Albania since March 25, 1999.29
The likelihood that the current conflict will lead to war between
Yugoslavia and Albania is high. Other bordering countries are
threatened as well. Macedonia, for instance, with an Albanian
minority estimated at between twenty-three (23%) and thirty-
five (35%) of its population (not counting Kosovar refugees),
faces the possibility of internal civil strife.30 More immediately,
Macedonia may come under direct attack because NATO troops
are stationed there.31
25 This is so despite the delay in NATO's action, which provided it with Caro-
line's "moment for deliberation." The one alternative that is always available is
inaction; NATO, after months of deliberation, may have decided that its only alter-
natives were to bomb Yugoslavia or to do nothing.
26 The West Versus Serbia, supra note 1, at 49.
27 See Walker, supra note 19, at 375 (noting that Kosovo, the "country" most
affected by Yugoslavia's actions, is not in a position to request assistance from
NATO or the United Nations, because it is not a state).
28 See How It All Started: No Place for Them Both, ECONOMIST, April 3, 1999,
at 20-21.
29 See A Week is a Long Time in a War, ECONOMIST, April 3, 1999, at 17-18.
30 See The Macedonian Exit Route, ECONOMIST, April 3, 1999, at 18.
31 This latter possibility involves an element of bootstrapping.
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If a right of anticipatory collective self-defense exists,
NATO is properly exercising that right in Kosovo, unless the
NATO operation violates some other provision of international
law. The Security Council has taken no action to end the NATO
campaign.32 A question that will need to be addressed, how-
ever, is whether NATO's actions violate its own constitutive
document, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. 33
B. The North Atlantic Treaty
Article I of the North Atlantic Treaty imposes two obliga-
tions upon NATO that may have been violated by the bombing
of Yugoslavia. The first obligation requires that:
[tihe Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be
involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. .... 34
The members of NATO have, individually and collectively,
made many attempts to settle disputes with Yugoslavia
through peaceful means. On the other hand, bombing another
country is inherently dangerous to international peace and se-
curity, even when the purpose of the bombing is to preserve
peace, security, and justice.
The second requirement pursuant to Article 1 is that the
NATO parties undertake to "refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations."35 Note that the lan-
guage here is somewhat different. In the first part of Article 1,
the parties undertake to settle disputes as set forth in the U.N.
Charter. In the second part, however, the parties promise not
to use force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
U.N., rather than promising not to use force in a manner incon-
sistent with the U.N. Charter.
The purposes of the U.N., as set forth in the Preamble of
the U.N. Charter and Article I, include "[re-affirming] faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
32 See Law and Right: When They Don't Fit Together, ECONOMIST, April 3,
1999, at 19-20.
33 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
34 Id. at art. 1.
35 Id.
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human person. . .,36 as well as "[promoting] social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom,"37 "develop[ing]
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,"38 and
"achiev[ing] international co-operation in solving international
problems of [a]... humanitarian character."39 The ostensible
reason for the bombings is to protect the rights of the Kosovars.
To the extent that NATO has accurately stated its reasons, the
NATO action is consistent with this second part of the North
Atlantic Treaty.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty creates a right to col-
lective self-defense. 40 The English text of the treaty uses the
same "armed attack" language as Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter,4 1 possibly indicating an intent by the NATO members to
abandon the right to anticipatory collective self-defense. Article
7 leaves the "primary responsibility.., for the maintenance of
international peace and security"42 in the hands of the Security
Council. Article 7 also includes a provision that the treaty "does
not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way
the rights and obligations under the Charter of Parties which
are members of the United Nations.. . ."43 This may prevent a
reading of Article 5 as intending to adopt a limitation, if any, on
the right of anticipatory collective self-defense. On the other
hand, this may be legalistic hairsplitting.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
At least two questions of customary international law arise
from the NATO action. The first is whether, regardless of the
existence of a right of anticipatory collective self-defense under
Article 51 in 1945, there now exists a custom of exercising antic-
ipatory collective self-defense under Article 51. The second is
whether, regardless of the limitations on the use of force con-
36 U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
37 Id.
38 Id. at art. 1, para 2. The "maintain international peace and security" provi-
sion in art. 1, para 1 is problematic. See id. at art. 1, para 1.
39 Id. art. 1, para 3.
40 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 33, at art. 5.
41 See id.; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
42 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 33, at art. 7.
43 Id.
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tained in the U.N. Charter, a custom of armed intervention to
prevent genocide exists or is coming into existence.
A. Customary use of anticipatory collective self-defense
In a comparison of instances of the use of force by states
and regional security organizations claiming Article 51 justifi-
cation, one author has assembled information 44 that, interest-
ingly enough, indicates that almost all of the actions taken by
individual states or temporary or informal groupings of states45
have been met with a strong negative international reaction.
These reactions have included condemnation by the General As-
sembly, attempted condemnation (vetoed by the offending mem-
ber) by the Security Council, formal complaints by the
Secretary-General and adverse determinations by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.46
In contrast to actions by states, most actions by regional
security organizations 47 have been met with, at worst, mild dis-
approval, and more often than not with approval. In most in-
stances, the U.N. took no action.48 "Peacekeeping actions" by
regional security organizations, of course, do not require Secur-
ity Council approval, 49 so long as the organizations advise the
Security Council of their actions. 50 "Enforcement actions," on
the other hand, do require approval. 51 Not surprisingly, it is
44 See Jane A. Meyer, Collective Self-Defense and Regional Security: Necessary
Exceptions to a Globalist Doctrine, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 391 (1993).
45 Some of these groupings were nominally security organizations, such as the
Warsaw Pact or the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, but were effectively
dominated by a single powerful state with Security Council veto power (The Soviet
Union and the United States, respectively).
46 See Meyer, supra note 44, at 401-402.
47 Meyer included NATO in her list of regional security organizations, despite
prior assertions by NATO members that NATO is merely a collective self-defense
organization. See id. at 423-424. In a post-Cold War Europe, this seems quite rea-
sonable. But see Simma, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that "NATO is not a regional
organization in the sense of Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter").
48 See Meyer, supra note 44, at 415-416 (noting nine actions by the Organiza-
tion of American States); see also id. at 418-419 (noting six actions by the Organi-
zation for African Unity); id. at 422 (noting five actions by the League of Arab
Nations).
49 See U.N. CHARTER art. 52.
50 See id. at art. 54.
51 See id. at art. 53, para 1.
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often very difficult to distinguish a peacekeeping action from an
enforcement action.
It appears, therefore, that there is an existing or emerging
normative expectation that permits anticipatory collective self-
defense actions by regional security or self-defense organiza-
tions where the organization is not entirely dominated by a sin-
gle member. NATO is such an organization and includes a
number of powerful states, three of which are permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council. The NATO action against Yugo-
slavia is thus a valid exercise of the right of anticipatory
collective self-defense as it has been developed via state practice
since 1945.
B. Armed intervention to prevent genocide
Although the NATO action may be legal as an exercise of
anticipatory collective self-defense, this is not the main justifi-
cation that has been advanced. The credibility of the NATO ac-
tion with the public, especially across the Atlantic in the United
States, rests more on its humanitarian motive. 52 Not every ge-
nocide that occurs will threaten the interests of a powerful na-
tion or regional security organization; there seems to be a
growing sentiment, nonetheless, that a right of intervention to
prevent genocide should exist. Many feel that armed interven-
tion to protect people from genocide at the hands of their own
government is not only morally justified but morally necessary.
Some are even willing to argue that customary international
law has already given rise to a normative expectation legitimiz-
ing actions of this nature. 53
52 The German government, for example, while recognizing the questionable
legality of NATO's actions, considered the situation in Kosovo "a state of humani-
tarian necessity leaving no choice of other means." Simma, supra note 2, at 6.
53 See, e.g., Law and Right: When They Don't Fit Together, ECONOMIST, April
3, 1999. See also FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY
INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997); MICHAEL O'HANLON, SAVING LIVES WITH
FORCE: MILITARY CRITERIA FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1997); THE ETHICS
AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Stanley Hoffman ed. 1996); SEAN
D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1996); ROBERT L. PHILLIPS & DUANE L.
CADY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: JUST WAR VS. PACIFISM (1996); Oliver Ram-
sbotham & Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict
(1996); Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Inter-
vention (1995); Francis Mading Deng, State Collapse: The Humanitarian Chal-
lenge to the United Nations, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND
RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 207 (I. William Zartman ed. 1995).
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The U.N. Charter was adopted in the aftermath of World
War II. Some of the worst atrocities of that war were commit-
ted by the Axis governments, particularly the German govern-
ment, against its own people. The U.N. Charter, however,
contains no provision allowing the use of force to prevent such
atrocities. In fact, Article 2(7) provides that "Nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state .... 54 This provision, however, also
includes the qualification that "this principle shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Some humanitarian interventions have been met with
widespread (although not universal) approval, such as
Tanzania's ouster of Idi Amin or the U.S./British maintenance
of no-fly zones to protect Kurds in northern Iraq.5 5 Other inter-
ventions have been less well received. When Vietnam's inva-
sion of Cambodia toppled one of the most brutal governments in
recent history, Vietnam was widely condemned as an aggressor
rather than commended for ending the Khmer Rouge's reign of
terror. 56
At present the view that humanitarian intervention is per-
missible is a minority one.57 Widespread acceptance of the
NATO action, however, especially given its scope and the in-
volvement of three permanent members of the Security Council,
could indicate the emergence of a normative expectation that
54 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 7.
55 The first of these, of course, was probably justified as an act of self-defense.
The second, although not specifically authorized by the Security Council, was ar-
guably a part of the Security Counsel-authorized war to end the Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait. See generally Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security
Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Ceasefires and the Iraqi Inspec-
tion Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (1999) (noting that although not explicitly au-
thorized by the security council, many U.N. members acquiesced in the effort to
provide safe havens for Kurdish refugees).
56 The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia could perhaps also have been justi-
fied as self-defense, especially in light of the treatment of the Vietnamese in Cam-
bodia by the Khmer Rouge.
57 See generally W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in
International Law, 10 YALE J. IN'L L. 279 (1985) (noting that humanitarian inter-
vention is one of nine categories in which use of force is accepted); Louis Henkin,
The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 37 (Council on Foreign Relations 1989) (arguing for the general principle
that right to limited intervention is acceptable but that it should not be extended
to topple governments or occupy territory).
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intervention to prevent genocide or forced expulsion of a popula-
tion does not violate international law. As one commentator
wrote:
This war has marked out with awkward clarity the irresistible
tension between two distinct forms of international law. The first,
and most familiar, of these is that of the United Nations Charter
designed to preserve the territorial integrity of sovereign states.
The second, born at Nuremberg and developed subsequently in
international conventions against genocide and torture, holds
that there are some crimes that transcend the inviolability of na-
tion states. 58
The Security Council itself, in Resolution 1199, referred to
"the impending humanitarian catastrophe" in Kosovo, and "em-
phasiz[ed] the need to prevent this from happening."59 The Se-
curity Council has not condemned the NATO bombings, despite
the efforts of some members to do so: on March 26, 1999, three
of the fifteen Security Council members voted to condemn the
NATO bombings. 60 On the other hand, the three countries
seeking to condemn - China, India, and Russia - are three of
the world's four most populous countries, containing nearly half
of the world's people; two are permanent members of the Secur-
ity Council. If their condemnation remains consistent, it would
be unlikely that a normative expectation permitting armed hu-
manitarian intervention would be formed.
IV. CONCLUSION
At present, NATO's actions violate international law unless
NATO has a right to anticipatory collective self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and unless that right was prop-
erly exercised. Because there appears to be a practice on the
part of the U.N. member states of tolerating such actions when
undertaken by regional security organizations, it does appear
that NATO has a right of anticipatory collective self-defense. It
58 Philip Stephens, Fighting a Just War, FINANCIAL TIMEs, April 16, 1999, at
12.
59 S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 12, at 2.
60 See Law and Right, supra note 32, at 19-20 (Regardless of the legality of the
bombing campaign itself, certain actions during the campaign may have been ille-
gal. The bombing of the Chinese consulate, while accidental, was an illegal in-
fringement on China's sovereignty, entitling China to some form of remedy.).
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also seems that Yugoslavia's actions in Kosovo pose a genuine
threat to the stability of the region.
It does not appear that there is currently a customary in-
ternational law norm permitting the use of force by states to
prevent other states from killing or expelling their own popula-
tions. 61 The practice of states in response to this incident (the
NATO action) may bring about a change in customary interna-
tional law, however: a high degree of approval, or even toler-
ance, for NATO's action on the part of other states might
indicate the emergence of such a norm.
61 Information on Yugoslavia's action before the International Court of Jus-
tice against the various NATO member states may be viewed at the International
Court of Justice website (visited Oct. 21, 1999) <http://www.icj-cij.org>.
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